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Lewin: Whose Values are Protected by Environmental Regulation--A Respons

WHOSE VALUES ARE PROTECTED BY
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION?
A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR EPSTEIN*
JEFF L. LEwiN**

I am honored to have been invited to write a response to Professor Epstein's lecture on regulation and contract in environmental
law. As usual, he is insightful and provocative.
Being somewhat familiar with Epstein's work and with his style
of speaking, I was surprised to find myself agreeing with his primary
thesis, at least at a theoretical level. Thus, readers who were hoping
for a frontal attack will be disappointed.
On the other hand, readers who were impressed by the lecture
may accuse me of quibbling. Although I take issue with much of
what Epstein says, my disagreement involves some reading between
the lines. The most problematic aspects of Epstein's lecture are buried in his underlying assumptions about the purposes and effects of
regulation. Many of his premises are stated so casually that one
might not recognize them as being controversial, while others are
never expressly articulated.
Epstein posits that a certain level of regulation is necessary and
inevitable because of the existence of "externalities" of cost and the
ultimate risk of environmental catastrophe. To determine the nature
and extent of this environmental regulation, Epstein employs the
paradigm of the "single owner": if one person owned all of the
Earth's resources, what level of environmental degradation would
that person be willing to endure and what limitation on the use of
these resources would that person be willing to tolerate in order to
maximize the "value" of these resources.
Copyright (c) 1991, Jeff L. Lewin.
Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. This essay is dedicated to
Eleanor Rose, Sylvia Klare and Gregory Pearce, and to their children's children. Their mother, Alison
Williams Lewin, embodies the values of my hypothetical "single owner" who is described in the essay.
*

**
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The single owner paradigm is rooted in both economic and moral
theory. Economically, the rational single owner can be expected to
maximize total value out of pure self-interest, so the decisions of
the single owner provide a benchmark for efficient resource utilization. Ethically, the Golden Rule and the Kantian categorical imperative mandate that one impose no burden on others, whether in
the form of pollution or of regulation, that one would not impose
on oneself. The first half of Epstein's thesis is that the decisions of
the hypothetical single owner would establish the economically and
ethically appropriate or "optimal" levels of pollution and of regulation. At this theoretical level, I wholeheartedly agree with him.
The second half of Epstein's thesis is that once the optimal levels
of regulation and pollution have been established within the society,
the "right to pollute" should be viewed as a property right, subject
to sale and exchange just as any other property right. Owners of
realty should be able to sell their right to be free from pollution or
to waive the right to recover damages from pollution. Air and water
pollution permits should be as freely assignable as any other licenses.
Again, at the level of theory, I agree with Professor Epstein.
Where Professor Epstein and I part company is our assumptions
about the level of pollution and regulation that would be established
by the hypothetical single owner. And these assumptions, in turn,
differ because of our assumptions about who this single owner would
be. In a nutshell, Epstein envisions the single owner as a business
corporation, whereas in my vision she is a loving parent.
Professor Epstein's single owner seeks to maximize the total value
of the Earth's resources. The single owner is a risk-neutral industrial
enterprise, and it seeks to maximize its profits from the productive
use of the Earth's resources. Regulation represents an interference
with economic activity which must be tolerated in order to assure
the survival of the enterprise's workers and customers, whose lives
have no other intrinsic value. All values are described in terms of
costs and benefits. Future costs and benefits are counted, but only
as "discounted" to present value at current market rates. Thus, if
market interest rates are approximately 10%, costs and benefits seven
years in the future count are discounted by 50%, those fourteen
years away are discounted by 75%, etc.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/4 The importance of intangible2
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and subjective values is acknowledged, but it is assumed that these
can be incorporated by making certain adjustments to the monetizable costs and benefits.
My single owner seeks to maximize the value of the Earth's resources for herself and her children. She seeks to maximize the quality of life by imposing the minimum level of interference with
environmental quality necessary to achieve an acceptable level of
economic activity. She is risk-averse, and is willing to pay a high
price to avoid environmental risks. She does not discount future
costs and benefits, but is more likely to forego current use in order
to save for her children. She knows that the most valuable resources
cannot be measured in dollars. The value of clean air is more than
just a reduction in medical expenses and lost wages. The value of
a wilderness park is more than the sum of the entrance fees that
visitors would pay to use it. The value of a species is not just the
sum of what people would pay to see it in a zoo.
She is not so naive, however, as to believe that there will be a
free lunch, that hard choices can be avoided, or that protection of
the environment can be accomplished without substantially restricting the material well-being of the planet's current residents, especially those in the world's least-developed regions. For her,
determining the optimal levels of pollution and of regulation is not
a simple balancing of costs and benefits; it is Sophie's Choice, for
which some of her children must suffer and die if others are to live.
The perspective of my single owner differs from Professor Epstein's in other important respects. Although environmental catastrophe is an "abyss" to be avoided, Epstein analogizes most
environmental hazards to such evanescent inconveniences as cooking
fumes or the noise from an electric shaver. (pp. 866-67) Accordingly,
he devotes disproportionate emphasis to discussion of low level reciprocal harms, correctly noting that they do not give rise to nuisance
liability under the substantial injury doctrine and the "live and let
live" rule. Epstein treats the current level of technology and resource
use as a given and is skeptical about our capacity for conscious
regulation. Hence, he seems to take it for granted that regulation
must be approached incrementally (pp. 861-862).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 93

My owner sees the effects of acid rain and the hole in the ozone,
and she fears that we may already have poisoned our wells. She
recognizes that incremental approaches may not suffice to reverse
several hundred years of environmental degradation, the pace of
which has been accelerating in the second half of the twentieth century. Given the inherent limitations of our knowledge and the potential irreversibility of ecological damage, she sees far more risk
from under-regulation than from over-regulation. It is environmental
damage, not environmental regulation, that ought to proceed marginally and incrementally.
Ultimately, our difference is one of perspective. Professor Epstein would solve the problem of regulation with reference to the
common law of nuisance (pp. 862-864), but the common law of
nuisance cannot tell us which of our two perspectives should prevail.
As Epstein notes, the common law abandoned the simple physical
invasion test as being both over- and under-inclusive. Today, the
common law of nuisance employs a "reasonableness" standard that
actually embodies both of our perspectives.' From the perspective
of an industrial enterprise, the reasonableness standard prohibits activity that is unreasonable insofar as it generates more costs than
benefits. From the perspective of the victim of pollution, the reasonableness standard provides protection against unreasonable interference, regardless of the value of the polluter's activity. If
nuisance law has not resolved the contradiction between the defendant-centered and plaintiff-centered perspectives on its reasonableness test, then it cannot be of much help in deciding the perspective
from which the single owner should view environmental regulation.
Our differing perspectives also lead me to question certain aspects
of the second half of Epstein's thesis, concerning the transferability
of environmental rights. Although we agree that such rights generally
1. My most recent discussions of the law of nuisance appear in Lewin, The Silent Revolution
in West Virginia'sLaw of Nuisance, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 235 (1990), and in Lewin, Boomer and the
American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALBANY L. Rv. 189 (1991). Professor
Epstein's complex views on this topic are found in Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEoAL Srtu. 49 (1979) (discussed at pages 256-58 of my Albany
article). In contrast to the defendant-centered tone of the current lecture, in his earlier article Epstein
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/4
4
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should be assignable, we often disagree on the identity of the owners
of these rights. In my view, private property is the creation of the
government, and all property is held subject to the right of government to impose reasonable regulations to promote public health,
safety, and welfare. Epstein would give far more scope to the rights
of the owners of resources, requiring the government to compensate
2
them for most restrictions on development.
Our conflicting perspectives are illustrated by the judicial response to wetlands regulation. Courts sharing Epstein's viewpoint
analyze wetlands regulation from the perspective of the potential
developer, and they invalidate restrictions on wetlands development
as a "taking" of the owner's property. Courts sharing my views
judge these regulations against the backdrop of the current pattern
of resource use, and they uphold these regulations as a legitimate
prohibition of the "nuisance" that would result from wetlands development.
Epstein correctly argues that if the government is forced to buy
out the rights of the developers, it is unlikely to engage in overregulation. On the other hand, putting the cost on the government
is likely to lead to under-regulation because the citizenry cannot
afford to pay protection money to every developer who threatens
environmental destruction.
Our perspectives lead to very different conclusions concerning
the Hodel case, 3 which upheld legislation mandating that strip miners
return the land to its "approximate original contour." Epstein complains that this law is inefficient because restoration to original contour on steep slopes could increase the amount of leaching and
physical damage. He says that "the right accommodation ...

is to

require restoration of land to a safe state, at the owner's expense,"
but the government should bear the cost for its "aesthetic concern
about returning the land to a state that existed prior to the mining."
(p. 875)

2. For Epstein's controversial views on the proper scope of government regulation, see R.
EpsTEN, TAJnos (1985).

3. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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I see several problems with Epstein's analysis. First, he incorrectly assumes that because restoration to original contour could be
inefficient in some cases, it must be generally inefficient. Then, based
on this initial error, he incorrectly presumes that the only rationale
for the original contour requirement must be aesthetics. Finally, Epstein ignores the significant feature of the law which led the Court
to reject the plaintiffs' facial challenge: "a 'steep-slope' operator
may obtain a variance from the approximate-original-contour requirement by showing that it will allow a postreclamation use that
is 'deemed to constitute an equal or better economic or public use'
'4
than would otherwise be possible."
Epstein's proposed regulation would be both unworkable and
unfair. Under his vague "safe state" standard, operators could assert that any minimal restoration was sufficient, which would put
the burden on the government to litigate or to offer to pay for
further restoration. In effect, operators would be able extort substantial compensation for their restoration efforts. Such a rule would
invite abuse, and it ultimately would leave the operators with very
little restriction on their "right" to strip coal.
The challenged provision actually represents an excellent example
of regulation and contract in tandem. The "approximate-originalcontour" standard is a "bright-line" rule which serves as an approximation of a "no environmental damage" standard, and it reserves for the government any gains that may be obtained by variance
from that standard. The operator is prohibited from altering the
original contour, but the operator can "purchase" the right to do
so by offering the public an equal or better economic or public use
than would be possible with the original contour.
One final caveat. Although I agree that environmental property
rights should be transferable, I get uncomfortable whenever the government begins to sell off our environmental heritage. The government almost always settles for too low a price. Federal range land
and national forests are leased at bargain rates, and western water

4. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 284 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1265(e)(3)(A) (1976 ed., Supp. III)).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/4
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is essentially given away as a subsidy to agribusiness. At least these
are renewable resources. We have thus far successfully resisted proposals for sale of our national parks. States and local communities,
however, are more likely to succumb to temptation and cash in on
the burgeoning demand for solid waste disposal sites, especially if
there are "externalities of benefit" in the form of direct or indirect
personal gain to public officials.
If the private owners of our resources can purchase environmental property rights at bargain-basement prices, the initial assignment of environmental property rights to the government would
yield only a short-term boon to the public treasury, rather than a
long-term protection against environmental degradation. Sometimes
it is better to emulate Ulysses and tie oneself to the mast, in this
case binding ourselves with the yoke of inalienability, because we
cannot trust ourselves or our representatives to hold out for a high
enough price. 5
In conclusion, I have no quarrel with Professor Epstein's theoretical description of the roles of regulation and contract in environmental law. Our differing perspectives on the necessity of
environmental protection lead to a vast divergence, however, in the
amount of regulation we would allow and in the bargaining leverage
we would reserve for the government. Differences in degree can
become differences in kind, and Professor Epstein and I advocate
very different kinds of environmental regulation.

5. Although the government may set too low a price on the sale of national resources, it does
not follow that it would be preferable to leave these resources in private hands from the outset. (From
an economic perspective, it makes no difference whether these resources started out in private hands
or were acquired from the government at bargain prices, for in either case economic theory predicts
that the resources eventually will be transferred to their highest valued private use.) The point here
is that the highest valued use of a resource is often a public use that would be destroyed by any

transfer to private ownership.
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